THEOLOGY

VOL. XLVII MARCH, 1944 No. 285

Editorial

As the deathly, total struggle with Germany approaches its climax, we need more than ever to be made and kept aware of the human anguish on both sides that is concealed by the machine-ridden impersonality that dazzles the eye, deafens the ear, and bewilders the mind. A Christian word, spoken now, while it will not weaken the resolution of those who are committed to a terrible and ineluctable task, will quicken compassion for all the victims of the wrath and guilt of man, wheresoever they be. We are for this reason deeply thankful for the publication of Miss Amy Buller's book, *Darkness over Germany* (Longmans, 10s. 6d.).

Books about Germany, its past, its present, and its future, have poured from the press. Most of us have read several, perhaps many, and are weary of thought about the subject. But this book stands out from the stream by its insight, its balance, and its courage. Miss Buller's intimate contact with Germany has extended over thirty years, and after the Nazi revolution she had and made opportunities, perhaps unrivalled among foreigners, of investigating what was happening on the spot. Not only does she know what she is talking about, but, unlike most German writers and, we may add, many English writers, she knows her audience here in England. She knows how to say what she wants to say. *Darkness over Germany* chiefly consists of stories, founded on fact, of what she saw and heard in Germany itself during the six years before the war. They are reporting of the best kind, marked by delicate and sympathetic interpretation and by an absence of the didactic temper. They leave the reader with an immense amount of food for thought, not only about the problem of Germany itself, but about the European crisis generally. One or two points have impressed us particularly.

In the first place, though Miss Buller wisely does not engage in a polemic against Lord Vansittart, and in fact never even mentions him, she has made a most illuminating comment on the ideas associated with his name. Her particular interest was in the large section of the German people who were neither thoroughgoing Nazis nor those open and uncompromising opponents of the régime who went into exile or the concentration camps. She provides abundant, first-hand evidence both of the awful predicament in which many of them were placed, and of the ways in which they withstood and worked against the infection from which they could not conscientiously or physically escape. There is no reason to believe, indeed in the light of what Miss Buller says it is impossible to believe, that they changed their ground and surrendered their souls after the outbreak of the war. These brave and harassed men and women, young and old, will have a most

responsible part to play, a part which no outsiders can expect to play, in the reconstruction and re-education of Germany. It is unwise, as well as wicked, to forget that they are there, and what they have been enduring all these years.

Secondly, while Miss Buller realizes well enough that political and economic factors account to a large extent for the success of the Nazi movement, she sees that it owed its peculiar dynamism and intoxication to the fact that it satisfied, though eventually in a diabolical manner, moral and religious needs, and that it filled a spiritual vacuum. That Nazism is a religion has often been loosely asserted; Miss Buller is able to give the assertion a quite definite warrant and content. Dogma, liturgy, kalendar, hierarchy, conversion, mysticism, ecstasy were all there, not merely on paper or in a textbook, but springing out of a communal enthusiasm and coincident with undeniable material achievements in secular life. This is an acute study of the emergence of a new and false religion, and a revelation of the ease and rapidity with which it can spread. It is this new and false religion that has held Germany in a passionate grip, and any planning for the future that does not realize what that implies, and how it came about, will be hopelessly inadequate.

Thirdly, though Miss Buller does not turn aside to draw morals, and considers it most unlikely that under similar conditions "a British version of the Nazi Party might rise here," she leaves her readers in no doubt that Nazism in its early stages attracted many good and sensible people, because it promised to satisfy spiritual and moral, as well as political and economic, needs that are still unmet in the Western world. That they are still unmet is for the time being obscured by the war, but until they have been met a study of the origins of the Nazi movement not only discloses the peculiar evils that have laid hold of Germany, but is full of warnings as to the evils by which other peoples in the West are menaced.

"Given the profound restlessness and insecurity that German youth, and indeed most Germans, felt, and given their scepticism about political and economic remedies for their dire necessity which twenty-three political parties had failed to relieve, I am wholly convinced that neither youth nor anyone else would have been even remotely interested if Hitler had declared he had founded a twenty-fourth party to solve their problems." Well, we have not got twenty-three political parties, but we have our manifold groups, schools of thought, etc., many of them professedly Christian, and still they multiply. But that is not how national revivals come about. They come about through religious movements, which touch the deepest springs of man's personal and communal life. The faith may be true or false, new or old, but it must have the dimensions of a faith in a Christ or in an Anti-Christ if it is to transform a whole society.

Whether the grounds of such a common Christian faith are yet discoverable in Britain is the question posed by the Archbishop of Canterbury's paper on "What Christians stand for in the Secular World" (*Christian News-Letter*, No. 198, December 29, 1943). On the level of theoretical definition the "Basic Decisions" which he sets forth

are pregnant with all the possibilities of a Christian and national revival. But there remains a vast gap between such pregnancy and a coming to birth. At present the possibilities are latent and underground. Must we be driven to a much deeper sense of need and awareness of our common guilt before we return unto the Lord our God in penitence and faith? He alone can bring about a health-giving renewal of our common life. *Peu de chose nous console, parce que peu de choses nous afflige.*

At all events, Miss Buller's book, though we doubt if it entered her head that it might be recommended for such a purpose, is a book for Lenten reading. It is a searching call to compassion and repentance and to national reformation, all the more effective for being indirect and parabolic.

Confessional Theology and the Anglican Church

I. The Holy Spirit has been at work among us during the last twenty years to produce a significant revival in the study of theology. The catastrophic events of our time have poised man on the edge of eternity. They have forced him to ask searching questions about himself and about the world in which he lives; questions so profound that they have demanded theological answers, answers which take account of man's eternal destiny and the God who created him. So theology has been born again in our midst. But it has not been a Modernist theology. The attempt to build a Modernist theology on man's religious experience failed because it could not take man beyond himself. The living vigorous theologies of our time are the old theologies: in the Protestant world the theologies of Calvin and Luther; in the Catholic world the theology of St Thomas Aquinas. Looking at the movement broadly we can regard it as a rebirth of Confessional Theology. We have been made familiar with this phrase through the Church conflict in Germany. The leaders of the opposition to Hitler's German Christianity fell back upon the teaching of the great fathers of their Church and the Confessions of Faith which they drew up in the sixteenth century. In the intolerant atmosphere of this new religious war, these old fighting confessions acquired a new relevance and the men who were forced to fight leaned on them for support. This return to classical theology is not confined to Germany and the Church faced with a life-or-death struggle there. It is a movement more generally characteristic of the age than that. Calvin has come back to us through Barth and his disciples; Luther through a group of Swedish writers; and St Thomas through that brilliant group of Roman Catholic philosophers led by Maritain and Gilson. Such in outline is the theological scene at the present moment. It is a rugged, brilliant scene, encouraging to those who have waited through the night to see what landscape the dawn would reveal.

II. The purpose of this article is not to give an account of this interesting situation in the religious world but to deal with this question: How has this revival of Confessional Theology affected the Anglican Church? Briefly I should answer that it has thrown it into

confusion. Anglicans have never been a closely knit, united religious group, and the divisions in the wider Christian world without have always too easily reflected themselves among us. So we have our own Neo-Calvinists and Neo-Thomists in our midst. We should expect that. What is more surprising is that the new theologies have disturbed the old party allegiances and we are confronted with the spectacle of High Church Barthians and Low Church Thomists, while some ingenious individuals are even trying to be Barthians and Thomists at one and the same time. A few years ago an eminent scientist jokingly declared that such was the confusion in the scientific world that he used one set of natural laws on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays and another set on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. There are many Anglican theologians who find themselves in the same position. Three days of the week they are Thomists; three days of the week they are Barthians; and on Sundays they provide for their bemused congregations whatever happens to be uppermost in their heads at the time. It is an exhilarating situation and it is producing much excitement on the theological front. Unfortunately more than theology is involved. Such a theological upheaval as this is producing in ordinary minds the feeling that theologians are irresponsible and best left alone, while the theologians are bitterly suggesting that the parish clergy and the Church as a whole have entered into a conspiracy to neglect them. Consequently the strange situation has arisen that, while Anglican theology is making considerable headway among the intellectuals of our time, it is neglected by our congregations and despised by the parish priests.

III. Disturbing though this situation is, it is not a new one in the history of the Church of England. It reflects with surprising accuracy the situation in which she found herself during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Then, as now, her theological life was rendered unstable and upset by elements which correspond to the Neo-Thomism and Neo-Calvinism of to-day. From Trent and Geneva alike there issued attractive theological settlements which possessed the simplicity and consistency of modern Barthian and Thomist reconstructions. Their appeal was tremendous. From the accession of Elizabeth to the exile of James II it was a real issue whether England should become Puritan or Romanist; whether, in the language of the twentieth century, the Anglican settlement should be Barthian or Thomist. Actually the Church of this land did neither. She evolved and perpetuated the "via media" which has drawn to itself the name of Anglicanism. In recent years the "via media" has fallen into contempt as a barren compromise unacceptable alike to the logical minds and desperate situation of the men of the twentieth century. But the "via media" is not a compromise; it is a living theological system fashioned in the crucible of sixteenth and seventeenth century religious life; holding the tension between Romanism and Calvinism, exactly the forces which are breaking over us to-day. It is that which gives it its relevance to our present situation. The theology of the "via media" has as much right to call itself a Confessional Theology as any of the reborn classical theologies which so imperiously demand our allegiance to-day. It is

becoming increasingly obvious that the pressure of these rival systems will drive us back to it in order to escape from the intolerable strain of offering allegiance at one and the same time to a revived Rome and a transplanted Geneva.

The founder of the "via media" was Hooker, and the reformed theology to which Anglican thought must make its return is not the reformed theology of Geneva or Trent but of Hooker and Elizabethan and Stuart Canterbury. For Hooker offers us exactly what we want. He maintains the conception of Natural Law which so attracts us in Thomism and at the same time holds to the reformed doctrine of Justification by Faith. It is objected to Hooker that he is Erastian; that his theology proceeds on the assumption that Church and Nation are inseparably joined in one community—a state of affairs which no longer applies in the twentieth century. But that is an objection which applies equally to all Reformation theology. The idea implied by the phrase "cuius regio, eius religio" was at the basis of every religious settlement in that age. In England at that time Puritans, Anglicans, and Romanists alike were all fighting for a uniform religious settlement in which their own faith should be the only one tolerated. To the further objection that Hooker's own theology is Erastian in a special way, two replies can be made. First, the assumption that Church and Nation were one in their allegiance to Anglicanism never did hold. Hooker was not writing the theology of the Church of England as it existed in his day. He was writing a theology on which that small nation, racked by all the religious controversies of the time, could find agreement. His comprehensiveness was an ideal, not a reality, and it is an ideal which remains worth striving for now as well as then. Anglicanism may not be the faith of all the English people; it is a faith for all the English people; it is the faith which the law of the land allows that people to claim for themselves. The amazing thing is that, writing in a century of such ardent nationalism, Hooker should have produced a theology which kept so close to Scripture, primitive tradition, and the Catholic faith. Secondly, we can add that Hooker's broad-based comprehensiveness is due, not so much to his Erastianism as to his belief in law. His idea of law as controlling all life and as reflecting the consistency of the Divine Mind is sufficiently wide to include within itself not only the religious needs of our age but the equally desperate need for a synthesis of our knowledge of the natural world as well.

IV. I have spoken at length of Hooker because he is the prince of Anglican theologians, the supreme confessional theologian of our Church. He laid the foundations on which others built. That others did build and build well we have the evidence of seventeenth-century theology to prove to us. Perhaps we have not the leisure to read through the lengthy sermons and many-volumed expositions of those days. Still, we have that fine volume of selections published by the S.P.C.K. under the title *Anglicanism*—one of the finest presentations of the faith of the Church of England issued since the time of the Tractarians.

My purpose is to show that amidst the rich theological confusion of our time we have a tradition to return to: a tradition as venerable as any for which our allegiance is demanded; a tradition which will guide

us through the theological labyrinth of our day with sound judgment and solid Christian devotion. Anglicanism is not a museum piece. It is a living faith, Catholic and Scriptural, securely founded, splendidly endowed. When other men are returning to the theological tradition of their fathers it is surely our duty to look again at our own. We have unrivalled possessions: our Authorized Version of the Bible, our Prayer Book, our churches, our parish life. These and the theology which has come to us with them are still worthy to stand beside the rival heritages of Geneva and Rome. Even the much despised Thirty-nine Articles can claim our attention as a Confessional document of those stirring times.

V. With these great gifts behind us, it may still be asked how we are to face the future. In this connexion we can, I think, take a lesson from the Oxford Movement. That movement began as a return to the classical seventeenth-century theology of the Anglican Church. It has come to a dead-end because it has wandered far from the original ideal which it set itself. It did this first, because it began as a university movement content in the main to exist in the hot-house atmosphere of university controversy. Secondly, because when it penetrated into parish life it could not resist what a seventeenth-century writer has called the "meretricious gaudiness of the Church of Rome." Thirdly, because those who were influenced by the movement were infected with an inferiority complex towards the theology and practice of their own Church and adopted an apologetic attitude towards them. Because of these things the work has to be done again. In the first place it is work which must be done in the parishes by parish priests. Seventeenth-century theology was parochial theology. Our parish clergy must set before themselves the duty of becoming learned in their faith. Because of their position in the world they have a wider contribution to make than those who are cloistered in our universities and theological colleges. In the second place our task demands a new loyalty to Anglicanism; a loyalty sadly lacking in the members of all ecclesiastical parties to-day. Loyalty to the Book of Common Prayer must replace our preference for bright, elaborate or informal services. Loyalty to the Anglican tradition must be substituted for our fondness for eulogizing the party statements of the extreme members of other communions. Loyalty to the demands of parish life must act as a break on our feverish committee and conference work and on the desire of young clergymen to escape from parish life into the universities or into attractive jobs as travelling secretaries of one religious society or another. Lastly, we must give our minds to the stern discipline of dogma: the dogma of our own communion, teaching what our Church teaches, condemning what she condemns. Too often in the recent past among us, concern for dogma has meant concern for the dogma of some other branch of the Church than our own. The doctrinal authority of the Church of England will only be respected when the dogma she proclaims is based on her own Confessional Theology and not on that of some other branch of the Church.

The duty before us can be summed up in these three words: learning, loyalty, dogma. Each man can set himself to the task in accordance

with his own special gifts, but it can only be a common task in so far as it is founded on a common faith. The Confessional revival of our own day points us to where that common faith can be found. It can be found by returning to the Confessional Faith of our own Church; to the theology of the Prayer Book and the Articles, of Hooker and the seventeenth-century divines. The theological situation of our time demands of the Anglican Church that she make her own answer to the challenge it contains. If we make that answer in the language of our own Confession, we shall not be left ashamed or in doubt when other men stand up in defence of their own faith.

PENTROBIN. J. H. JACQUES.

The Holy Spirit in the New Testament

AN EXAMINATION OF SOME TEXTS

THERE is in circulation a hymnbook which a well-known divine once described as the psalter of the Holy Spirit. So innocuous is it, and so unencumbered by any specifically Christian doctrine, that our Local Educational Authority (and no doubt others as well) is prepared to supply copies to all schools whose managers will accept them. It is characteristic of that book that it seems to go even out of its way to avoid reference to the doctrine of the Atonement and anything that it implies; and it might be interesting to inquire why in that case it should have occurred to its admirer to claim for it any unusual degree of spirituality.

One may observe, in the first place, that although "ghost" and "spirit" are synonymous terms, the one English and the other Latin, and therefore to speak of the Holy Ghost is the same as to speak of the Holy Spirit, in practice those who habitually use the Latin word tend to a vagueness of conception which is not far from Unitarianism. Everyone knows who God the Holy Ghost is; our school-children will tell you that He is the third Person of the most holy Trinity. It is not easy to say who the Holy Spirit is; if an answer had to be given it is probable that very many people would say that It (rather than He) is God's influence upon our souls. There is a tendency to depersonalize Holy Spirit into a mere influence, or into even less than that—a point of view or attitude of mind, and particularly that attitude of mind which is the speaker's own. That, I imagine, was what lay behind such an enthusiastic testimonial to an unsatisfactory hymnbook; for that book does indeed express the mind of a large school of feelers rather than thinkers, who keep their highest approval for those forms of doctrine which are of most modern growth and which contain little to shock the intelligence and nothing to convert the hearts of our contemporaries. But that is a long way from our ancient faith in God the Holy Ghost, who sanctifieth me and all the elect people of God.

Secondly, there is a tendency to sentimentalize the Holy Spirit. It is a very ancient tendency, exemplified by those heretics of the second century who discovered that in the Semitic languages the words

for "spirit" are of feminine gender, and made the most of that fact. One has heard it remarked that the Holy Spirit represents the female element in the Godhead—whatever that may mean. Fortunately such vagaries are not common. Another piece of sentimentalism, in fairly wide use, is drawn from the mistranslation "brood" in the R.V. margin of Gen. i, 2. The idea, apparently, in the mind of the sacred writer was that at first, just after the beginning, when the earth was without form, and darkness was upon the face of the deep, the outlook was as of the flat dullness of stagnant and motionless mud and water on a sunless and windless day—perhaps the most dismal and lifeless prospect imaginable. But then the Breath of God, like a fresh and life-giving wind, began to stir the surface into ripples, and life came into the world: the creation had begun to take shape. The Hebrew participle *merahepheth* occurs only once more in the Bible, of the eagle fluttering with her wings; the compilers of the Revised Version, seeing the ornithological connexion, got hold of the word "brood," and, ignorant or oblivious of the fact that the last thing a brooding hen does is to flutter, suggested it in both places.[1] But this is a far cry from the strong wind of God, which gives life and movement to created things and becomes in man the seed of immortality and in Christian men the fullness of divine power. One might also observe that in four hundred years since the Bible was translated the word Comforter, which means either Advocate or Encourager, has been sentimentalized to mean "consoler," a fact which we all learn in our Confirmation classes.

Coming now to the point, our suggestion is that in the New Testament, except where it means an evil spirit, or where it means the human spirit in a metaphysical sense, the term "spirit" means either God the Holy Ghost or else those spiritual gifts which are the effect of His presence in Christian men. Never, we suggest, does it mean a vague influence, and far less does it mean an attitude of mind or a point of view. We, therefore, propose to expound, in what seems to be their true sense, a few passages which are commonly misunderstood in the sense which we are controverting.

We begin with two texts in which the Holy Spirit, or simply "the Spirit," is the author of the inspired scriptures. St Matt. v, 3: "Blessed are the poor in Spirit." This can hardly mean that there is any blessedness in spiritual neurasthenia: "poor in spirit" cannot mean spiritually impoverished, spiritless, lifeless, self-mistrusting. Equally, if we take St Luke's version of this saying, "Blessed are ye poor," one could hardly say that there is any blessedness in poverty as such. But there is a perfectly natural interpretation of πτωχοὶ τῷ Πνεύματι, though it may be a less obviously natural interpretation of the English "poor in spirit." The poor in the Spirit are those whom the Spirit, the author of the Old Testament, calls "the poor"—"The poor shall not always be forgotten, the patient abiding of the meek shall not perish for ever," and many similar texts. The poor, in the sense in which the Holy Ghost uses the word, are those who, in contrast with the

[1] The distinction is important: the sitting hen draws out the latent life within the egg; the Spirit of God at the creation imparted life from without.

overbearing ungodliness of proud and rich and powerful oppressors, have put their trust in God, and find in Him their strength; and these are blessed, really happy, as God understands happiness. (Moreover, one suspects that the English word "meek" has changed its meaning since 1611: it hardly now represents the Greek πραεῖς, which signifies gentleness rather than cringing submission.) With our suggested interpretation of "poor in the Spirit" we compare St Matt. xxii, 43, "How then doth David in Spirit call him Lord?" Here the point is that David, inspired by the Holy Ghost, calls Messiah "my Lord"; and since the Holy Ghost cannot make mistakes it follows that there is a sense in which David's Son is David's superior. How can such a thing be, unless it is that Messiah, while He is David's Son (for this fact also is well attested by the Scriptures), is also of higher origin, being the Son of God? (The neighbouring text, "Why callest thou me good?" demands a similar interpretation: our Lord is not denying His own goodness, but is insisting that men must be conscious of the full implications of the words they use—"If you call me good, with any sincere use of the word, you must of necessity acknowledge my divine origin.") Souter's text has ἐν Πνεύματι (with a capital), and this seems to be right.

2 Cor. iii, 17: "The Lord is the Spirit." This text, misinterpreted, is the only possible basis for the frequently repeated assertion that St Paul identifies Christ with the Holy Spirit; rightly understood, we suggest that it is the clearest affirmation in the New Testament of the deity of the Holy Spirit. St Paul is claiming that the ministry of the New Dispensation, with which he and others are entrusted, is of more excellent glory than even the ministry of the Old Dispensation. That Old Dispensation ἐγενήθη ἐν δόξῃ, was brought into being with glory: that must not be denied; yet its glory is overshadowed by the glory that excelleth. Moreover, even in its own day it was a glory that was hidden: after Moses had been in converse with God his face shone with the reflection of the divine glory; but he was constrained to put a veil over his face when he returned to speak with the people. In a short digression St Paul remarks that that veil is a parable of the present state of Jewish teachers and hearers: a veil lies over their heart (*i.e.*, their determinative understanding), with the result that they fail to apprehend the true meaning of the divine Scriptures when they hear them read. But, returning from his digression (and here both the English versions miss the point), "whensoever he returneth to the Lord the veil is taken away": *i.e.*, as Exodus says, when Moses went back to converse with the Lord he took the veil off. And this is a parable of the Christian dispensation, for "the Lord is the Spirit" (again there is a mistranslation)—that is, by "the Lord" in this text of Exodus is meant the Holy Ghost; and we Christians, reflecting with unveiled face the glory of the Lord, not only reflect it but also assimilate it, and are being transfigured into God's image, from our present glory to a glory even greater, a glory which we derive from the Lord—that is to say, the Spirit (again a mistranslation hides the true sense). Evidently there is here no identification of our Lord Jesus Christ with the Holy Spirit; but there is a clear statement that in the

text of Exodus before us the name JHVH means the Holy Spirit, who therefore is the Lord God. And here we observe that it is a principle of the New Testament interpretation of the Old, of which several examples could be adduced, that the God of the Old Testament is not God the Father but God, though not yet openly revealed as three Persons: and consequently the name JHVH sometimes means the Father, sometimes the Son, and sometimes (as in this text of Exodus—at least so St Paul asserts) the Holy Spirit, while yet there is one Lord JHVH.

Rom. viii, 15: "Ye did not receive the spirit of bondage again, to fear, but ye did receive the Spirit of adoption, in whom we cry, Abba, Father." What is meant by "the spirit of adoption"? Surely something more definite than the vague consciousness, or even the firm conviction, that we stand to God in the relationship of sons to a father. Let us suppose that here again "the Spirit" means the Holy Ghost. Then what St Paul says is that when you were baptized and received the Spirit (the aorists representing a definite fact in past time) you did not receive such a spirit as was to reduce you again to bondage, substituting bondage to God for bondage to Satan, but you received the Holy Ghost, whose effect upon you was to promote you by adoption to the position of sons. Expanding the sentence slightly by the introduction of thoughts from elsewhere in this chapter we might express it thus: "By your natural birth you were not God's sons but His creatures; moreover, through sin and its consequences you had been reduced below that level, to the level of bondage or slavery to evil; but by the operation of the Holy Ghost at your baptism you were made free from that bondage, though not for the purpose of being transferred to a different bondage which would evoke fear; rather, by that same operation of the Holy Ghost, you were made members of Christ, and therefore, being now 'in Christ,' the only-begotten Son of God, in Him who alone is God's Son by nature and right, you have yourselves become sons of God by adoption and grace, and are privileged to address Him by the name of Father: it is the Holy Ghost who has done this in you."

We are trying to show that in the New Testament the word "spirit" does not mean any attitude of mind or point of view of ours, but does mean God the Holy Ghost, who by His operation in us brings into existence a real state of affairs which justifies a certain attitude of mind, and makes such a change in us as to produce an altered relationship with God and consequently an altered point of view. Two further texts have a meaning equally objective.

Rom. viii, 8, 9: "They that are in the flesh cannot please God. But ye are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you." So the English versions. But the Greek says εἴπερ πνεῦμα Θεοῦ οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν—εἴπερ οἰκεῖ, not ἐάνπερ οἰκῇ. The Apostle is addressing Christians; he is not leaving it doubtful whether the Spirit of God dwells in them or not: there is no doubt about it, for the Spirit of God dwells in all Christians. Εἴπερ with the indicative introduces not a problematic but a logical condition, the minor premiss of a syllogism; and the correct translation is not "if so

be that," as if there were any doubt about it, but "forasmuch as," an acknowledged fact, from which can be drawn the conclusion that forasmuch as the Holy Ghost is dwelling in you you are not in the flesh but in the Holy Ghost, and therefore you can and do please God. St Paul might not have said that to all Corinthians; but he was specially concerned to say it to all Romans, because he admired that Church and was anxious to make friends with it; and he would have been justified in saying it even to the Corinthians as a body, because that is the state to which all Christians have by divine grace been promoted.

2 Cor. iii, 6: "The letter killeth, but the Spirit giveth life." In the whole New Testament there is probably no more misused text than this, and the misuse has blinded the public mind to the true character of the Christian ethic and the true effect of divine grace. St Augustine was aware of its misuse in his own day, and in the treatise *de Spiritu et Littera* set forth the obviously correct meaning. But it needs some intelligence to read St Augustine or to understand St Paul, and the erroneous interpretation persists in the popular mind. Some of my former pupils, when I remonstrated with them for drinking in public bars or similar misdemeanours, and pointed out that if their own sense of what was fitting could not guide them there were rules of the College which governed the matter, would retort, "Oh, I keep the spirit of the rules, not the letter": as if one were to claim to keep the spirit of the ninth commandment by writing libellous lampoons upon all one's neighbours, of course in a friendly spirit. It is, of course, perfectly evident that there is here no question of any contrast between the letter of the law and the spirit of it; nor is there any text of Scripture which suggests the expression "the spirit of the law," not to mention any idea that a spiritual interpretation of the law is a relaxation of the letter of it. Our Lord's careful and detailed teaching in the Sermon on the Mount makes the Gospel more and more stringent than the Law. What St Paul is saying is that the Law of the Old Testament is a holy and a good law: he says the same at greater length in Romans vii, and adds that the Law was so holy and righteous and good that as long as he was trying to follow its precepts by his own unaided strength it so to speak crushed him by the weight of its sublime and unapproachable goodness: "the letter killeth." But on his conversion he found, in the first place, that in Christ all his previous shortcomings, as it were debts which he owed to the Law, were cancelled: he died with Christ, and by that death obtained remission. And, in the second place, from Christ he received the Holy Ghost, so that what was before impossible to his own power was now more than possible by the power of the indwelling God: "the Spirit giveth life." Here is the justification of the more searching and stringent law of Christ; for the Christian experience is—and on this the Christian doctrine of grace is founded—that, inexorable and unlimited as God's demands upon us may be, He asks for nothing but what He Himself through the indwelling Spirit is prepared to perform in us and for us. So we are able to work out our own salvation, precisely because it is God who is actively at work in us, both in the guidance of our will and in the performance of what by so

guiding the will He has prevailed upon us to determine; and so we are allowed to pray, *Da quod jubes et jube quod vis.*

If this article has accomplished its purpose it has indicated the realism which characterizes the scriptural teaching concerning God's dealings with mankind. The act of God in creating the world is a real act from outside the world to which the world in process of creation cannot but respond. The act of God in redeeming mankind is a real act, but not entirely from outside; for humanity is in a special position of privilege, having been endowed by God with the attributes of His own personality. God will not infringe upon this privilege by saving men without their own will or without their own co-operation; and therefore, by the Incarnation of the eternal Son, He enters within human nature, so as to save mankind by divine act from inside it. Likewise, the sanctifying of the elect is a real act of God, who through the eternal Spirit takes up His abode within each individual believer, demanding not so much our initiative as our co-operation with His initiative: and our co-operation consists of faith, which responds to the divine initiative which is grace, and by that response makes room for the further operation of the Holy Ghost which we call grace concomitant. The method of that divine operation is the communion of Person with person; for divine grace never destroys human independence, since the fellowship of the Holy Spirit, though always the power of God, is never mere force.

E. Evans.

Hellifield.

An Idol of the Market Place

In present-day discussions which claim to treat the connexion or lack of connexion between science, political theory, and religion the term "materialism" is prominent. In so far as this term is often used polemically and, one feels, sometimes emotively, it can become a serious hindrance to thought and that in departments of study which today more than ever call for a reasoned clarity. If what has been suggested is true it is really important to ask what doctrines it claims to denote, because behind the emotive and polemical use of the term there is quite clearly an attempt to designate certain doctrines. This note is nothing more than a preliminary attempt to state what different views seem to be smuggled into discussions when the term "materialism" is used. It is not necessary to assume that these views are clearly distinguished by the writers, and sometimes it may well be that more than one theory is implicit in the work of any one author. Moreover, it is not being contended that the name "materialism" is justifiably used to cover these theories; the use of the *word* "materialism" is undoubtedly largely a matter of the mental climate of the recent decades. All that is being suggested is that the prevalent modern use of the term has become so indeterminate both in popular writing and in general speech that it is necessary to ask what theory or theories it covers.

And the same is true about the word "spiritual," which is used quite indiscriminately in the modern day to designate theories incompatible

one with another. It may well be that the confusion is not at all widespread, and if so the confusion that does exist is in the present writer's mind. But if on the other hand the suspicion is well founded, then the present discussion is relevant to theology because the term is used in written and spoken apologetics both for and against religious belief.

1. Sometimes the term covers the theories which claim that scientific categories give us the only possible knowledge about reality. This theory is opposed to the claim that religion puts us into touch with what is real, and at its best theology is relegated to poetic fancy and to an expression of human hopes, aspirations, and fears; at its worst theology is conceived of as a useless wrangling. Many who say that religion is essentially an illusion and that its categories are figments of the imagination are called "materialists" in this sense. This sense of the term seems to appear in some ways fundamental to the modern age, and many who would assent to some particular theory that will be mentioned later would also claim that their particular theory is compatible with the standpoint we are now noting. The underlying conviction of those who accept this view is the belief that it is possible to feel satisfied about the epistemological claims of science, but that this satisfaction is not possible about the epistemological claims of religion. This doctrine in its modern form is connected with positivism and the rapid growth of science at the close of the last century; and one cannot help feeling also that some of the superficial claims of liberal theology to show that there was no clash between religion and science only made matters worse, because the specific religious claims were minimized and the method of scientific procedure insufficiently mastered. This general "materialistic" claim has made explicit a real problem for theology, and has shown that an inquiry into the nature of knowing is important for the theologian because this inquiry is related to the meaning of notions like "revelation," "belief," "faith," etc. But even if it is admitted that some of the categories of science cannot be used in religion nothing important has been conceded to the scientist, because if the objects of religion are different from those of science, or even if the same objects are viewed from a different standpoint, there is no clear reason why the categories of science should be the apt ones for the religious view. It does not then follow that all difficulties have been solved for the theologian; because he has still to explain what in fact are the "objects" of religion, and what knowledge of these "objects" is possible, and how it should be expressed.

The naïve nature of this theory is sometimes apparent when it claims that it has dispensed with, what it would call, useless metaphysical discussion; whereas in fact it is full of uncriticized metaphysical categories like "cause," "substance," etc. The assumption that the categories of science possess a kind of self-evidence which is denied to all other categories, and especially to those of religion, is a thoroughly unwarranted claim which cannot be established; it is nevertheless a claim that is easily made in an age impressed by the achievements of natural science.

2. The term "materialism" in current discussion also covers an old theory which has been called "sensationalism"[1] but which is also sometimes given the vague name "empiricism." This doctrine goes back to Hume and it has regained a vogue in certain psychological schools in our time. It is the teaching that to think is merely to have "images,"—acts of thought and acts of volition in the sense that these are usually understood are denied, and, in so far as it is at all justifiable to speak of "mind," the "mind" is reduced to the having of sensations and images and to the retaining of these images and the associating of them with each other. The more popular versions of this theory assume that the notion of "mind" has been explained away, Hume, when he pursued the doctrine with a thoroughgoing consistency, denied all abstract notions, and among other things this meant the denying of the abstract notions of religion; but it also meant the denying of the abstract notions of science; so notions like "mind," "soul," etc., were denied, but so also were notions like "cause," "substance," etc. Hume consistently denied both classes of abstract notions; but in current popular sensationalist theories we merely hear of the denial of one class of such ideas—viz., ideas like "mind," "soul," etc.; while the usual scientific notions are retained uncritically—indeed, they are even made use of in the exposition of the theories. In current discussion there is little doubt that such sensationalist theories are thought of as disproving the legitimacy of speaking of "mind" and hence such theories are vaguely spoken of as "materialist" (sometimes by the propounders and generally by the opponents of the theories).

3. There is a third theory which seems to be implied by some of the usages of the term "materialism." It is the theory that there are no mental events that are not caused by bodily events; to assert this is to deny that any mental event *causes* any other mental event, and it is to deny also that any mental event can cause a bodily event whatsoever.[2] This view denies the commonly accepted view that mental events can be causal factors in themselves and that often such mental events are the really important causal factors in a situation. What are called "acts of mind" then become mere "appearances" of certain physiological processes. Whether this theory can be substantiated we are not here concerned to discuss; but there is one point to note: it is a theory that has caused confusion to those who have assumed that any "spiritual" view of life demands the postulation of a pure ego which "owns" mental states and is a constituent of every individual self. Now quite clearly the theory here noted implicitly denies the notion of a pure ego which persists through all experiences and which "has" the experiences; but even if there is no pure ego I think it is still possible to give a theory of the mind which meets many of the demands of those seeking a religious philosophy. The mind could, for example, be defined in terms of mental events that are systematically connected; when we

[1] It need not be assumed that these expositions use the term "sensationalism," but the argument propounded above is current in present-day writings.

[2] See Broad, *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, pp. 118, 473. No writer concerned with treating "theism" philosophically can ignore the *method* and conclusions of Broad's inquiries.

have events so connected we have a "mind," but when we have events poor in content and jumbled together as an aggregate we have nothing that deserves the name "mind."[1]

4. Still another theory which has had much vogue in the recent past seems to be referred to when a general attack is made on "materialistic" views, and this is probably because of the suspicion that the theory in question reduces human nature to an automaton. This theory is sometimes confused with the immediately preceding one, but the third theory acknowledged mental events although it had a radical way of explaining their status; the present theory *reduces* mental events to physiological events proper. The notion of mind is reduced merely to "behaving" in certain ways. Of course it is quite clear that we assume that a certain thing has a mind if we perceive that it behaves in a certain way; but this obvious point is not what is stressed—it is being asserted rather that there is no such thing as "mind" except in the sense that what is called a "mind" can be reduced completely to physiological events. Hence if we persist in saying that "X has a mind" all we *should* mean is "X behaves in certain ways." To say "*this is all we should mean*" is a dogmatic assertion of this behaviouristic theory—what seems more to the point is that this is not by any means all that we do in fact mean when we say that "X has a mind." Again, according to this view, to ask the question whether "Smith has a mind" is to ask a stupid question, because it means nothing more than to ask whether Smith, who admittedly behaves in a certain way (because he is a human being and not an inanimate object), does in fact behave in a certain way.

5. Then there is the usage of the term "materialism" in the context of the doctrine of dialectical materialism[2]. This doctrine essentially claims among other things—

(*a*) That the class structure of any given society is causally entailed "by the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange" and that it is causally entailed by *nothing* else.

(*b*) That the causal situation which gives rise to the class structure of any given society gives rise to the class conflict in that society.

(*c*) That because every society has a *determinate* class structure and exemplifies a *determinate* class conflict, then members of such societies are predetermined to think in a particular way, and in no other way, about social questions.

(*d*) Moreover, not only is their thinking about social questions predetermined in this way but what is called their interest in truth and righteousness is just—(1) an "ideological camouflage," (2) a reflection of the economic interests of the day; and hence the so-called principles of truth and righteousness are analysable *without remainder* into non-veridical sentiments and non-ethical characteristics. Even if it happens to be the case that statements (*a*), (*b*), and (*c*) above are acceptable, it is

[1] I think that a theologian who accepts this view would have to ask himself whether it implies the doctrine of conditional immortality.

[2] A clear statement of this teaching is to be found in H. G. Wood's small book *Christianity and Civilisation*. This statement is to be welcomed after the ambiguities of the Marxist exponents. The above treatment is indebted to this work.

impossible that the Marxist should ever know that they are. He does not know what *all* the causal factors of any historical situation are, and even if he did he would not know how these causal factors must be interconnected at any particular time. His theory, in so far as it builds on (*a*), (*b*), and (*c*), is one begotten in a dogmatic slumber and the historian should have an easy time in adducing illustrations to controvert its sweeping claims. On the other hand, it is necessary to draw attention to the very real importance of the economic factor in history and also to its importance in the general deportment of people (their emotional and intellectual deportment). In this sense Marxism has undoubtedly come to stay.

As regards point (*d*) above, if it is valid, then it is, *ex hypothesi*, valid of all theoretical inquiries into questions about the truth of theories and the desirability of practices. It is then, of course, valid about the Marxist theory itself, and we are left with the position that Marxism itself is nothing more than an ideological camouflage and a reflection of economic interests. This, I think, is the position that most people in this country would be prepared to accept if the phrase "very largely" was interpolated into the last sentence in place of the phrase "nothing more than."

What relevance has all this to our present position? The answer is a simple one. It has an important connection with Christian apologetics, a branch of sacred learning that the Church at her best has taken most seriously. The Christian apologist must move more and more carefully and avoid the wholesale condemnations and generalizations that have become far too prominent in this field of recent years. With the growth of these generalizations and the absence of careful analysis there is a grave danger that theology should give up its concern with what is true and degenerate into an ideology—interesting in so far as it is indicative of the states of mind of its authors,[1] but detached from the quest of truth. St Francis Ferrer of the Order of St Dominic, a great Mission preacher and for many years Confessor to Benedict XIII, has apt words on this point. Preaching on the Threefold Peace from the Gospel for Easter I, he states: "Man acquaints himself with God by his fidelity to Him, by keeping his baptismal vows. But the fidelity of this homage is destroyed when man has recourse to divinations and the like, being as a traitor, for he ought not to have recourse to them in his necessity." The divinations condemned are oracular utterances, final and comprehensive, and out of joint with the hard-won knowledge that is given to us *in statu viatoris* and which is also given to us *semiplene*—half fully.

H. I. Davies.

Lampeter.

[1] The treatment of Luther and Calvin in the work *The Fear of Freedom* by Erich Fromm is a timely warning that the present age is not prepared to accept what is said by theologians at its face value. Here we have theology explained away in terms of a psychology and sociology.

The New Testament Terms for Divorce[1]

Paul in his remarks on divorce uses the terms χωρίζεσθαι and ἀφιέναι. Both are good technical terms for divorce.[2] Yet it is clear, on the one hand, that ἀφιέναι is a much better rendering of what a Jewish husband does when he "dismisses" his wife—namely, of *gerash* or *shalah* (or, in Aramaic, *p'ṭar*, *tarekh*, *shabheq*[3]); and, on the other hand, that a Jewish wife under Jewish law cannot ἀφιέναι her husband but only "go away" from him, *halakh*, *yaṣa'* (*n'phaq*), or "separate" in the sense of avoiding intercourse, *parash* (*p'rash*). Under Jewish law, technically, only the husband can dissolve the marriage.[4] The woman may run away or refuse compliance, which has no legal effect whatever; and, given certain conditions (for example, if the husband practises the craft of a coppersmith or tanner, or is afflicted with boils), she may institute proceedings culminating in the husband's being compelled to divorce her. But even in the latter case it is the husband who dissolves the marriage, though against his will. Consequently, in 1 Cor. vii, 10 *f.*, with reference to a marriage where both parties are believers, Paul uses the intransitive χωρίζεσθαι of the wife who "separates," but the transitive ἀφιέναι of the husband who "dismisses" his wife. This is in perfect agreement with the Jewish ideas on the subject. In vii, 12 *f.*, with reference to a marriage where only one party is a believer, Paul uses the transitive ἀφιέναι both of the dissolution of the marriage by the husband and of its dissolution by the wife. This application of ἀφιέναι to the dissolution of the marriage by the wife is justified since the procedure that Paul has in mind is a non-Jewish one, Roman or Greek. Again, in vii, 15, Paul uses χωρίζεσθαι of the dissolution of the marriage by an unbelieving partner, husband or wife. No justification for χωρίζεσθαι here is needed, the verb being a proper term for divorce.

In confirmation of this analysis, I may point out that, in rabbinic literature, the transitive *gerash*, "to expel," is used once and once only (as far as I can see) of the wife "dismissing" her husband, and that is in the discussion of gentile divorce. The Rabbis say that in some gentile nations the institution of divorce does not exist at all, that in some husband and wife *m'ghar'shin ze 'eth ze*, "expel one another," and that even the wife may *gerash*, "expel," her husband.[5] (The case of husband and wife expelling one another is obviously divorce by agreement, very common in Rome and Greece.[6]) This is a close parallel to the way in which Paul, in 1 Cor. vii, 12 *f.*, uses ἀφιέναι of the action of the wife under gentile law.

---

[1] The following observations were contributed to Professor C. H. Dodd's Seminar at Cambridge. I am indebted to Dr W. Knox for valuable advice.

[2] See the dictionaries.

[3] The latter verb, however, suggests "forsaking" rather than "dismissing."

[4] It is sufficient to refer to the account of divorce given by Strack-Billerbeck in commenting upon the relevant passages of the N.T., particularly Mat. v, 31 *f.*

[5] Genesis Rabba 18, Palestinian Kiddushin 1, 58c.

[6] See, *e.g.*, Friedlaender, *Sittengeschichte Roms*, 9th ed., Vol. I, p. 284.

As regards Paul's "Aryan" followers at Corinth, I suppose most of them would be under either Roman law or Greek law. In the Roman law of the time, that kind of marriage by which the wife came into the *manus* of her husband (that is to say, passed out of her father's family and came under her husband's rule, *filiæ loco*) could be dissolved only by the husband; while the other kind, without *manus*, could be dissolved by either party. The latter kind, without *manus*, was no doubt more frequent in the first century.[1] As for Greek law, under the old Attic law a husband could divorce his wife, but a wife could dissolve the marriage only with the help of the Ἄρχων—a system not unlike the Jewish. She had to produce valid reasons, and the later writers of comedies were fond of this situation.[2] When we consider the Talmudic discussions of the question on what grounds a woman may claim release from marriage (a few of the recognized grounds have been mentioned above) we can well believe that here was material for the comedists. In the Greek law of the papyri, however, of more importance in this connexion, either party might dissolve the marriage. But it is noteworthy that even in the papyri the verbs expressing "dismissal," ἀποπέμπειν, ἐκβάλλειν and the like, are not used where the wife dissolves the marriage. What she does is ἀπολείπειν, χωρίζεσθαι, ἐξέρχεσθαι, and so on.[3] Clearly, it is an instance of language reflecting a stage long past. It was left to Paul and the Rabbis, who looked at the gentile practice from without, to call it by its proper name. They saw, and said, that a gentile wife could "expel" (*ʾăfiénai*, *gerash*) her husband.

Of all the synoptic passages concerning divorce, Mark x, 12 is the only one to contemplate a dissolution of the marriage by the wife. Moreover, the transitive ἀπολύειν is here used of the wife "dismissing" her husband. This sounds most un-Jewish. On the other hand, there is a variant, in D and some versions of the *Itala*, reading the intransitive ἐξέρχεσθαι (καὶ ἐὰν ἐξέλθῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἄλλον γαμήσῃ instead of καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὴ ἀπολύσασα τὸν ἄνδρα αὐτῆς γαμήσῃ ἄλλον). This sounds Jewish (*yaṣa'*, *e.g.*, of the wife's "walking out"). Is the more Jewish variant to be considered the original? If so, ἀπολύειν was introduced by somebody not familiar with the Jewish ideas on the subject and under the influence of the use of ἀπολύειν with reference to the dissolution of the marriage by the husband in the preceding verse—an easily intelligible case of assimilation. If we do not accept D and the versions of the *Itala* concerned as the better reading, we must assume that the source from which they received their text has for some reason or other Judaized the passage. That ἀπολύειν should have been replaced by ἐξέρχεσθαι through carelessness is incredible.[4]

In Mat. xix, 6 and Mark x, 9, in the rule that "what therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder," we find the verbs

[1] See Buckland, *Text-Book of Roman Law*, 2nd ed., pp. 112 *ff.*

[2] See Lipsius, *Das Attische Recht*, Vol. II, part II, pp. 485 *ff.*

[3] See the dictionaries, and Mitteis-Wilcken, *Grundzüge der Papyruskunde*, Vol. II, part I, pp. 216 *f.*

[4] The prevalent reaction of the Seminar was to incline to the former alternative and prefer the reading with ἐξέρχεσθαι.

συνζευγνύειν and χωρίζειν. They are doubtless used in a general, untechnical meaning; though it may well be that their choice in this context was favoured by the fact that they are reminiscent of συγγνέεσθαι, in the sense of "to marry," and χωρίζεσθαι, in the sense of "to leave" husband or wife. It should be observed that the rabbinic *zawwegh*, which goes back to the Greek word ζεῦγος, while it may mean "to join together" two things in any way, is often used of God's "joining together" husband and wife[1] and, in the form *'izdawwagh*, signifies "to marry." A good rabbinic equivalent of χωρίζειν is *parash* (*p'rash*), which may signify "to put asunder" (transitive) or "to separate" (intransitive) in a general sense and "to separate" (intransitive) in the sense of "to avoid intercourse." The Greek word, used in its general sense, occurs in an admonition not so dissimilar to that of Mat. xix, 6 and Mark x, 9, in the *Testament of Zebulon* ix, 4: Μὴ οὖν χωρισθῆτε ἐν δυσὶ κεφαλαῖς ὅτι πᾶν ὃ ἐποίησεν ὁ κύριος κεφαλὴν μίαν κέκτηται καὶ ὤμους δύο, χείρας δύο, etc. It is true that the particular division against which Zebulon warns his children is not division between husband and wife but political division.

In conclusion, a question may be raised. The LXX's terms for "dismissing" a wife are ἐκβάλλειν (for *gerash*) and ἐξαποστέλλειν (for *shalaḥ*); possibly we might add ἀφιστάναι, in view of βίβλιον ἀποστασίου (for *sepher kerithuth*). The synoptic passages without exception employ ἀπολύειν, even where they quote the O.T. Paul uses ἀφιέναι. Is any inference to be drawn from this absence of the terms of the LXX? It may be added that Philo and Josephus again use different terms. Philo uses ἀπαλλάττεσθαι of the wife who "is dismissed" by her husband (if he has not in mind the wife who, as in gentile practice, "leaves by agreement"),[2] as also of the wife who, falsely accused by her husband of not having come to him as virgin, may "leave" him whether he wishes her to or not.[3] This right of the falsely accused, incidentally, is neither biblical nor rabbinic; Philo must have introduced it under the influence of his philosophy and of gentile practice. His nouns for "divorce" are ἀπαλλαγή[4] and διάζευξις.[5] Josephus speaks of the husband "dismissing" his wife, ἀποπέμπεσθαι (middle),[6] and of the husband who wishes to "part" from his wife, διαζευγνύεσθαι.[7]

David Daube.

Cambridge.

[1] Jerusalemite Targum Dt. xxxiv, 6, Genesis Rabba 68, Babylonian Sota 2a.

[2] *De Spec. Leg.* I. 9. 105, III. 5. 30.

[3] III. 14. 82.

[4] III. 14. 80. Philo here refers to a husband who cannot find a proper ground for divorce, ἀπαλλαγῆς πρόφασιν. If this phrase was common, we can account more easily for the present corrupted text of the *Testament of Joseph* viii, 5, which makes Joseph praise God for casting him into prison, ὅτι διὰ προφάσεως ἀπηλλάγην τῆς Αἰγυπτίας.

[5] III. 14. 80. Cp. III. 11. 70, where he explains the law that a man who has illicit intercourse with a virgin must marry her and can never divorce her; he adds that nothing but death διαζεύξει the marriage.

[6] *Ant. Jud.* IV. 8. 23. 247.

[7] IV. 8. 23. 253.

BOOK REVIEWS

DARWELL STONE. By F. L. Cross. Dacre Press. 30s.

This admirable book is made up of 224 pages of biography and 208 pages of documents extracted from Dr Stone's letters, memoranda, and papers. But the biography itself enshrines many further documents or parts of documents. It is arguable that the proportions have been wrongly allotted. As with so many Oxford scholars, Darwell Stone's personal story was so private to himself, and in a way so uneventful, that it scarcely offers material for a large-scale biography. His influence was far more in the realm of ideas than in that of activities. It is true that from time to time he helped in the moulding of ecclesiastical strategy, almost always in the interests of moderation and conciliation. But his mind turned gladly from these things to the study of first principles, the enrichment of knowledge and the advancement of thought. It was here that his vast learning, his magnificent memory, and his untiring diligence won greatness for him; by these means that he influenced the trend of events and the development of other people's lives. To the diminishing number of those who knew Paget, Lord Halifax, Gore, Frank Weston, and others, the record of Stone's agreements and disagreements with them on points of policy has a certain interest. But this book adds little if anything to what we already know of the kaleidoscopic history of the Church of England between the years 1890 (shall we say?) and 1935, from such standard works as Dr Bell's *Randall Davidson*, Dr Prestige's *Gore*, Mr Lockhart's *Lord Halifax*, and more recently Dr Henson's *Retrospect*.

For that reason it might have been better had the biography proper been compressed, thus making it possible for more of Stone's public pronouncements, whether in speeches or papers, to have been brought within the two covers of the book. It is evident that Dr Cross has had to reject much material of this kind which he would have liked to publish, for want of space alone. What he has published amply vindicates his summary of Stone's outstanding qualities: "his sureness of touch, his unruffled temper, his capacity for getting at the essence of the matter while allowing the details to look after themselves, and, on the other hand, his care for precise and accurate draftsmanship in resolutions and reports" (p. 113). The documentary part of the book is in fact encyclopedic. There is scarcely a problem of theology or ecclesiology which is not represented among the selections from Stone's writings; and on page after page we find arguments of permanent value set out with finished dexterity and richly equipped with references and illustrations. The very full table of contents and the excellent index make it possible to ascertain not merely Stone's own views, but also much of the evidence on which he based them, with unusual ease.

Dr Cross is at pains to dissociate Darwell Stone from the "widespread (Tractarian) agreement that those particularist elements in the Anglican tradition which distinguished the Church of England from

the rest of Catholic Christendom, so far from being a limitation, were to be valued as the expression of a distinctive mission and vocation." "These supposedly positive elements in the Anglican tradition," he adds, "counted for nothing with Stone" (p. 61). But Stone was no Romanizer. He may have felt, as Dr Cross says, "a great sympathy towards all things Roman"; but passage after passage in his writings show that he could never have become a Roman Catholic himself. His appeal was always to the Universal Church, East and West alike; and where the voice of the Universal Church seemed hesitant, he betook himself to the question of first principle. Ultimately, therefore, he was an Anglican of Anglicans. He had learnt from the Fathers and the Schoolmen that reason is a God-given instrument; and he applied it, reverently and yet fearlessly, wherever the interpretation of Scripture or the deliveries of tradition were in serious doubt.

One of the most illuminating of the letters for the understanding of Stone's position is No. 54 (pp. 285-7). In this he starts from the question of the permissibility of marriage after ordination, but makes the problem a peg on which to hang a whole philosophy of Anglicanism —a philosophy, moreover, which should in its general outline commend itself to Anglicans of every school of thought. He divides the laws and customs of the universal Church into three categories: those as to which there is general agreement that no local Church can rightly alter them; those "as to whose alterability there is the same sort of agreement"; and then a third group, in between the other two, as to which "the decision whether a local Church can or cannot alter them depends on whether a principle, and if so what principle, is involved." Of this group he gives four important instances, which (unfortunately) are not fully discussed; and, curiously enough, while on the question of the marriage of clergy his argument leads him to support the English Article, in another matter (that of the Confirmation and Communion of infants) he finds himself standing with the East against both Rome and Canterbury. Of clerical marriage he says: "On my view that the point of importance is whether or not a vital principle is involved, I find it very hard to form an opinion whether there is such a vital principle in the difference between marriage before ordination and marriage after ordination. To me the practical difficulty in the allowance of marriage after ordination is less than the practical difficulty in the refusal of Confirmation and Communion to infants; and the latter is of the Church of Rome as well as of the Church of England. Both Rome and England made to be law a mediæval abuse which had become a custom in the West against the law of the West as well as the East."

Most Anglicans will dissent, perhaps with emphasis, from this conclusion on the subject of infant Confirmation and Communion. But at least it shows that Stone was never afraid to allow reason to have the last word in matters of genuine debate. What mattered was not what Rome said—not even what the East said (though even on the question of clerical marriage he is at least as favourable to the East as to Rome, and on that of infant Confirmation and Communion more so)—but what was "the principle involved." And the conclusion of

the whole letter sets out a view as insular as it is invigorating: "I stick on in the Church of England, remembering that if the Reformation, as well as other influences, made a mess in a great many matters, there is plenty of mess also in Rome and the East." The man who could write that sentence can never fairly be set aside as an academic obscurantist.

KENNETH OXON.

THE CROSS AND THE ETERNAL ORDER, A STUDY OF ATONEMENT IN ITS COSMIC SIGNIFICANCE. By Henry W. Clark. Lutterworth Press. 14s.

THE GREATER VICTORY. Broadcast Addresses by the Radio Padre, the Rev. Ronald Selby Wright, S.C.F. Longmans. 3s. 6d.

To be asked to make a single review of these two books is to be set a severe exercise in synthetic composition, for there could hardly be a wider difference in matter and in manner between two theological writings. When one has said that both are deeply sincere, and that in both the authentic voice of the Christian preacher makes itself heard, one has exhausted the common material. From that point the review must proceed on separate lines.

Dr Clark's book is the fruit of at least thirty-three years of theological reflection, for its opening chapter, laying down the presuppositions necessary to a sound theology of the redemptive process, saw print thirty-three years ago, and all that follows is strictly in line with the principles there expounded. It is fitting enough that there should be warmth and colour in the writing and, from time to time, something of a suggestion of the pulpit; but in the main he writes as the theologian, with the emphasis upon the metaphysical aspect of theology. His purpose in writing, despite the vastness of his theme and the breadth of his treatment, may be stated very simply. He is disturbed at the tendency, both natural and widespread, to think of redemption from man's point of view, and so to make man and not God the centre of our universe and of our discourse. This is in one sense inevitable, since it is only from where we are and with our own instruments of reason, intuition and the rest, that we can look out upon the cosmic spaces. But it is nevertheless true, obvious as soon as we think of it, and imperative when we have followed Dr Clark a little way, that we should always remember that the ultimate significance of it all is significance primarily for God, and only for us so far as we are being fulfilled in Him. The book is, in fact, a vigorous recall to the Godward aspect of Atonement, addressed primarily to theologians of the evangelical tradition. Neither the substitutionary conceptions of Atonement nor the so-called moral theory do justice to this demand, for both alike fail to pass beyond man and his need and to see Redemption wholly in the light of God and His purpose.

The thesis here advocated may be said to have two focal points: a truly dynamic conception of the cosmic process, demanding an equally dynamic conception of that redemption whereby its true direction can be restored, and a deeply mystical conception of the way in which men, one by one, are related to that process in Christ through His Cross.

The special function of the Cross and the Resurrection is to release the Christ of history from the particularity of time and place, so that He becomes the eternal Christ, thereby becoming wholly available to all men in that fullness of His Godhead which is the key alike to the Creation and the Incarnation. But this is only an indication. The book should be read.

The Radio Padre would not claim that his addresses are serious and considered theology. Their interest lies wholly in their character as studies in the very young art of preaching by wireless. Their success has been real, and it is well deserved. But theologically minded readers must not be over-critical. The addresses faithfully embody the Pelagianism dear to the British mind. Everybody is really splendid, though there is a dreadful lot of immorality about. Really such splendid fellows ought to play up better in some ways. Perhaps to put it so is a bit unfair, and there is some admirably frank speaking, with some vivid bits of real Christianity. Incidentally, it was a pity to spoil a very sensible re-orientation of the story of Jonah by suddenly going back on it all and hinting that there may be some truth in reports of men reappearing alive after being swallowed by sharks. Frank Bullen's sperm whale is better than that, though pretty bad. But why muddle people's minds, after so carefully and tactfully getting them straight? The real and fatal flaw in these homilies is, of course, not of the author's making. The tacit assumption that war is not even a problem, and that men engaged in it need no guidance and no comfort for their conscience, made the addresses, for one reader at least, completely unreal. Which is a pity, for in so many ways they are very good indeed.

Oxford. L. W. Grensted.

Education and the University. By F. R. Leavis. Chatto and Windus. 6s.

This is an important book which should be read by all who are concerned with the problems of contemporary culture and the business of education. Devoted readers will recognize much that has already appeared in *Scrutiny*, but there is valuable new material, and it is good to have Dr Leavis's argument as to the necessity and nature of humane education set out as an ordered whole. The first chapter deals with the recognized need for training "a kind of central intelligence" to co-ordinate our many specialisms; this intelligence should be grounded in the humane tradition of English culture, and Dr Leavis believes that it could best be formed within one of our older universities, where the thread of continuity may still be discerned. "Cultural values" are considered "as human and separable from any particular religious frame or basis," but Dr Leavis hopes for the "active countenance and co-operation" of Christians, since the collapse of generally accepted beliefs would seem to demand re-exploration of experience, and it would be wrong to "impose in advance the order that can only be expected to emerge in course of time." His second chapter suggests a sweeping reform of Part II of the Cambridge English Tripos, substitut-

ing for the present academicism a study of the seventeenth century in all its aspects, religious, cultural, political and economic, with the special approach of a trained literary sensibility. What this sensibility involves is explained in the third chapter, and reinforced in two appendices, one an admirable essay on "T. S. Eliot's Later Poetry," and the other a welcome reprint of the pamphlet *How to Teach Reading*, first provoked by Mr Ezra Pound's *A.B.C.*

This little book would remind me, if reminder were necessary, of how much I personally, as a student and teacher of English literature, and of how much so many of us, owe to the precept and example of Dr Leavis. Here, as always, his "practical criticism" and comments on method are admirable; to would-be critics the book is indispensable. But I am less sure of Dr Leavis on more general themes. My uncertainty could best be conveyed in a few questions, which fall under two main heads:

(1) How far can a Christian co-operate in a study of tradition which does not start from the acceptance of Christian dogma? Does not the Christian at times evaluate differently from the non-Christian (and is not local evaluation a part of the reading process)? *E.g.*, some non-Christians tend to see maturity in a cultivated scepticism, and *for them* it may be reasonable to do so. Would it not be well, then, to have a certain number of orthodox Christians among the directors of study in this corporate approach to the seventeenth century, though their findings might be somewhat different from the others? Perhaps Dr Leavis would agree here; he certainly anticipates some orthodoxy among the students.

(2) Is a trained sensitiveness to words possible for all of high intelligence or only for those of special talent? Accepting at first Dr Leavis's point of view, I have tended to modify my opinion in the course of university teaching. I think it likely that many may be sensitive and intelligent about cultural values—the relative values of different modes of social life—and about precise human situations, who may yet be incapable, whatever their training, of perceiving these values and analysing such situations, when they are presented poetically. With ordinary prose they have no difficulty; their attention is no more concentrated on the verbal level than it is in conversation. Poetry, however, seems to require, in the reader little less than in the writer, a talent for words which may not be general even among the intelligent, and in some ages may be even less frequent than in others. Would not this suggest that history, in its widest connotation, may be a better central study to produce the generalized intelligence which is desired, and that literary criticism, though closely linked to it, should remain one of the specialized studies?

The fact that such questions suggest themselves only serves to stress the importance of Dr Leavis's book in approaching one of our more urgent contemporary problems.

S. L. Bethell.

University College,
Cardiff.

Printed in Great Britain by
Billing and Sons Ltd., Guildford and Esher